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THE KADI SAGA AND THE RULE OF LAW
WITHIN THE EU
Koen Lenaerts*
THE “monism v. dualism” divide is not useful to assess the way inwhich international law is incorporated into European Union law(EU law). On the one hand, the incorporation of public interna-
tional law into EU law follows, to some extent, a “monist approach.”1
Once it has been established that the European Union (EU) is bound by
an international obligation, the latter becomes an integral part of EU law.
In other words, for an international agreement or for a principle of cus-
tomary international law to be “the law of the land,” there is no need for
the EU political institutions to pass secondary EU law “translating” such
an agreement or principle into EU law. In addition, as Article 3(5) of the
Treaty on European Union (TEU) states, “[i]n its relations with the wider
world, the [European] Union . . . shall contribute to peace, security, . . .
the protection of human rights . . . as well as to the strict observance and
the development of international law, including respect for the principles
of the United Nations Charter.”2 To a large extent, this provision codifies
the case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) according to which
the EU “must respect international law in the exercise of its powers.”3
On the other hand, the EU is an “autonomous legal order” whose consti-
tutional features—such as the principle of direct effect, the primacy of
EU law, and the protection of fundamental rights —distinguish it from
public international law.4 Accordingly, in order for an international
agreement (or a principle of customary international law) to form part of
EU law, it must not call into question the constitutional structure and
values on which the EU is founded. In particular, this means that the
incorporation of international law into EU law must ensure compliance
with fundamental rights as recognized in the Charter of Fundamental
* Vice-President of the Court of Justice of the European Union, and Professor of
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1. Koen Lenaerts, Droit international et monisme de l’ordre juridique de l’Union, RE-
VUE DE LA FACULTE´ DE DROIT DE L’UNIVERSITE´ DE LIE`GE 505 (2010) (Fr.).
2. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 3(5), Oct. 26, 2012,
2012 O.J. (C 326) 1, 27 [hereinafter TEU].
3. Case C-286/90, Anklagemyndigheden v. Poulsen, 1992 E.C.R. I-6019, ¶ 9; Case C-
162/96, Racke v. Mainz, 1998 E.C.R. I-3655, ¶ 45; Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am.
v. Sec’y of State for Energy and Climate Change, 2011 E.C.R. I-13755, ¶ 123.
4. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Admin., 1963
E.C.R. I-12.
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Rights of the European Union (the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights).5
Accordingly, the incorporation of international law into EU law is the
result of a balancing exercise between safeguarding the EU’s constitu-
tional identity and making sure that EU law does not become hostile to
the international community, but that it is an active part of it. The pur-
pose of my contribution to this symposium is thus to illustrate that con-
tention by looking at the Kadi I and Kadi II judgments.6
I. THE KADI I JUDGMENT
The Kadi I case involved the implementation at EU level of a series of
UN Security Council Resolutions (Resolutions) that contained a list of
persons associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda network, and
the Taliban whose assets had to be frozen.7 A Sanctions Committee es-
tablished by the UN Security Council (UNSC Sanctions Committee) was
responsible for amending and supplementing that list.8 It is worth point-
ing out that those Resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII of the
Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter).9 This meant that since
those Resolutions were adopted for the purposes of “maintain[ing] inter-
national peace and security,” they had to “be carried out by the Members
of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate
international agencies of which they are members.”10 “In the event of a
conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations
under the [UN] Charter and their obligations under any other interna-
tional agreement,” Article 103 of the UN Charter states that “their obli-
gations under the [UN] Charter shall prevail.”11
The EU implemented those Resolutions by adopting Regulation No.
881/2002, which reproduced that list, but without informing the persons
concerned of the grounds for the freezing of their assets.12 Mr. Kadi and
the Al Barakaat International Foundation, whose names were included in
that list, challenged Regulation No. 881/2002 before the European Gen-
eral Court (EGC, formerly the Court of First Instance).13 They argued
5. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 47, Dec. 12, 2007, 2007
O.J. (C 303) 1.
6. Joined Cases C-402 & C-415/05P, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Comm’n
(Kadi I), 2008 E.C.R. I-6352; Joined Cases C-584, C-593, & C-595/10P, Comm’n v. Kadi
(Kadi II), (July 18, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62010CJ0584&lang1=
en&type=TXT&ancre=. See generally, Kadi on Trial: A Multifaceted Analysis of Kadi Trial
(Majet Aubel; et al. eds. 2014).
7. Kadi I, 2008 E.C.R. I-6352, ¶¶ 20-21.
8. Id. ¶¶ 15, 21.
9. Id. ¶ 73.
10. Id. ¶¶ 3, 9.
11. Id. ¶ 10; U.N. Charter art. 103.
12. Council Regulation 881/2002, 2002 O.J. (L139) 9 (EC) (imposing certain specific
restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with the Al-
Qaida network). The list of persons whose assets are to be frozen set out in that Regulation
is regularly updated by the Commission. Commission Implementing Regulation 583/2014,
2014 O.J. (L 169) 27. As of May 28, 2014, that list has been modified on 214 occasions. Id.
13. Kadi I, 2008 E.C.R. I-6352, ¶¶ 1-2.
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that Regulation No. 881/2002 violated their right to a fair hearing, their
right to property, and their right to effective judicial protection.14
In essence, the EGC and, on appeal, the ECJ were asked to determine
whether by implementing the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions,
Regulation No. 881/2002 had become immune from judicial review, as
such review would call into question the primacy of the UN Charter.15
The EGC took an “internationalist” approach in answering this question,
whilst the ECJ gave priority to the constitutional identity of the EU.16
At the outset, the EGC noted that, since the EU is not a Member of
the UN, it is not bound by the UN Charter by virtue of public interna-
tional law.17 The EU is, however, bound by the UN Charter by virtue of
EU law itself.18 To reach that conclusion, the EGC applied the “theory of
succession” according to which “in so far as under the EC Treaty the
[EU] has assumed powers previously exercised by Member States in the
area governed by the [UN Charter], the provisions of that Charter have
the effect of binding the [EU].”19 By adopting Regulation No. 881/2002,
the EU had replaced its Member States in fulfilling their obligations
under the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.20 Concomitantly to
that transfer of powers, the EGC reasoned that the EU also became
bound by the UN Charter.21 The EGC was thus precluded from examin-
ing the validity of Regulation No. 881/2002 under EU law, since such ex-
amination would run counter to the primacy of the UN Charter.22
That being said, the EGC found that the validity of UN Security Coun-
cil Resolutions could still be examined in the light of jus cogens, “under-
stood as a body of higher rules of public international law binding on all
subjects of international law, including the bodies of the United Nations,
and from which no derogation is possible.”23 Whilst the notion of jus
cogens endorsed by the EGC was broad enough to cover the fundamental
rights relied upon by the applicants, the level of protection afforded to
them was significantly lower than that granted under EU law. For the
case at hand, this meant that none of the applicants’ fundamental rights
had been violated.24
First, jus cogens only protected the applicants against arbitrary depriva-
tions of property.25 Here, this was not the case, since the freezing of their
14. Id. ¶¶ 49-50.
15. Id. ¶ 280.
16. Daniel Halberstam & Eric Stein, The United Nations, the European Union, and the
King of Sweden: Economic Sanctions and Individual Rights in a Plural World Order, 46
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 13, 50, 62. (2009).
17. Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council & Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-3649, ¶ 192.
18. Id. ¶ 193.
19. Id. ¶ 203; see, in this regard, Joined Cases 21-24/72, Int’l Fruit Co. v. Produktschap
voor Groenten en Fruit, 1972 E.C.R. 1219, ¶ 18.
20. Kadi v. Council and Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-3717-18, ¶¶ 200–04.
21. Id.
22. Id. ¶ 225.
23. Id. ¶ 226.
24. Id. ¶¶ 252 276, 291.
25. Id. ¶ 242.
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assets was a temporary precautionary measure that did not apply to basic
expenses and pursued a legitimate objective, namely the maintenance of
international peace and security.26 Second, whilst acknowledging that the
applicants had no right to be heard before the UN Sanctions Committee,
the EGC found that such limitation was, for the purposes of jus cogens,
acceptable in light of the objectives pursued by the UN Security Coun-
cil.27 Third, the EGC reached the same conclusion regarding the right to
effective judicial protection.28 In spite of the fact that the applicants had
no judicial remedy against the decisions of the UN Sanctions Committee,
such limitation on their right of access to a court was also legitimate with
regard to the objectives pursued by the UN Security Council.29 As a re-
sult, the EGC dismissed the action for annulment brought by the
applicants.30
On appeal, the ECJ took a different view. It held that the EGC had
erred in law by considering that an EU Regulation implementing a UN
Security Council Resolution was, for the purposes of EU law, immune
from judicial review.31 In that regard, the ECJ recalled that the EU must
respect international law in the exercise of its powers.32 However, “the
obligations imposed by an international agreement cannot have the effect
of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the [Treaties].”33 For the
case at hand, this meant that the approach followed by the EGC ran
counter to “the [constitutional] principle that all [EU] acts must respect
fundamental rights, that respect constituting a condition of their lawful-
ness which it is for the [ECJ] to review in the framework of the complete
system of legal remedies established by the Treat[ies].”34 An international
obligation that is in breach of those constitutional principles cannot form
part of the EU legal order.
Accordingly, the ECJ annulled Regulation No. 881/2002 in so far as it
concerned the appellants, since “[their] rights of the defence, in particular
the right to be heard, and the right to effective judicial review of those
rights, were patently not respected.”35 This was so because they had not
been informed of the grounds for their inclusion in the list containing the
names of the persons whose assets had to be frozen.36 Regarding the right
26. Id. ¶¶ 239 243, 247, 289.
27. Id. ¶ 268.
28. Id. ¶¶ 285-88.
29. Id. ¶ 289.
30. Id. ¶¶ 291-92.
31. Kadi I, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351, ¶ 330.
32. Id. ¶ 291.
33. Id. ¶ 285.
34. Id. ¶ 285.
35. Id. ¶ 334.
36. Id. ¶¶ 334, 336. In this regard, the ECJ found that the Council had failed to comply
with its obligation to communicate to the appellants the grounds on which their names
were included in the list laying down a body of restrictive measures, “so far as possible,
either when that inclusion is decided on or, at the very least, as swiftly as possible after that
decision in order to enable [them] to exercise, within the periods prescribed, their right to
bring an action.” Id. ¶ 336. It is true that
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to property, the ECJ recognized that threats to international peace and
security posed by acts of terrorism may justify the freezing of assets of the
persons identified by the UN Security Council as being associated with
Al-Qaeda.37 However, since Regulation No. 881/2002 did not enable the
appellants to put their case before the competent authorities, the freezing
of their assets constituted an unjustified restriction of their right to
property.38
Kadi I was commented on by academia at length.39 Scholars have tradi-
tionally examined that judgment of the ECJ from three different, albeit
closely related, perspectives—namely from a constitutional perspective,40
from an international-law perspective,41 and from a fundamental rights
perspective.42 First, on a constitutional level, the Kadi I judgment stresses
the fact that EU law is an “autonomous legal order” and that the EU
judiciary plays a fundamental role in protecting that autonomy.43 The
ECJ is first and foremost committed to upholding the “rule of law” within
the EU which reflects fundamental rights recognized as general principles
of EU law which are now enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights.44 Thus, when EU fundamental rights are at stake, the incorpora-
tion of international law into EU law is not automatic. In order for inter-
national law to become “the law of the land,” it must pass muster under
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.45
Second, it is true that the Kadi I judgment demonstrates that interna-
tional obligations entered into by the EU are not absolute, as they may
not prevail over the basic constitutional tenets of the EU legal order.
“overriding considerations to do with safety or the conduct of the interna-
tional relations of the [EU] and of its Member States may militate against the
communication of certain matters to the persons concerned and, therefore,
against their being heard on those matters. However, that does not mean,
with regard to the principle of effective judicial protection, that restrictive
measures such as those imposed by the contested regulation escape all re-
view by the [EU] judicature once it has been claimed that the act laying them
down concerns national security and terrorism.”
Id. ¶¶ 342-43. Moreover, the ECJ ruled that “the contested regulation, in so
far as it concerns the appellants, was adopted without any guarantee being
given as to the communication of the inculpatory evidence against them or as
to their being heard in that connection, so that it must be found that that
regulation was adopted according to a procedure in which the appellants’
rights of defen[c]e were not observed, which has had the further consequence
that the principle of effective judicial protection has been infringed.” Id. ¶
352.
37. Id. ¶ 363.
38. Id. ¶¶ 369-70.
39. For a survey of the literature, see Sara Poli & Maria Tzanou, The Kadi Rulings: A
Survey of the Literature, 28 Y.B. EUR. L. 533, 533-58 (2009).
40. Marise Cremona, EC Competence, ‘Smart Sanctions,’ and the Kadi Case, 28 Y.B.
EUR. L. 559, 588 (2009).
41. Poli & Tzanou, supra note 39, at 535.
42. Enzo Cannizzaro, Security Council Resolutions and EC Fundamental Rights: Some
Remarks on the ECJ Decision in the Kadi Case, 28 Y.B. EUR. L. 593, 593-600 (2009).
43. Kadi I, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351,¶ ¶ 282, 317.
44. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 51, 2007 O.J. (C 303)
1.
45. Id.
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However, this does not mean that EU law has completely broken away
from its international law origins. On the contrary, it shows that the ECJ
does take into account the EU’s international obligations when exercising
its powers of judicial review. When striking the balance between the EU
principle of effective judicial protection and international law, the Kadi I
judgment reveals that the ECJ has paid due attention to the general inter-
est of protecting international peace and security.
Third, the Kadi I judgment shows that the ECJ is seriously committed
to the protection of fundamental rights. In so doing, it has shown that the
EU Courts must operate as the guarantors of individual rights and that
the EU’s international obligations may not deprive fundamental rights of
their substance. Notably, in the Kadi I case, the ECJ honored its role as
protector of those who do not enjoy sufficiently strong political represen-
tation to have their voices heard, i.e. the persons blacklisted.
II. THE KADI II JUDGMENT
Soon after the ECJ delivered its judgment in Kadi I, the Commission
sent Mr. Kadi a “narrative summary” elaborated by the UNSC Sanctions
Committee, which stated the main reasons why his name was included in
the list.46 In light of that summary, the Commission decided to keep his
name on the list, giving him the opportunity to comment on those reasons
and to provide any information that he might consider relevant.47 Mr.
Kadi sent his comments to the Commission, requesting disclosure of the
evidence supporting the assertions and allegations made in the narrative
summary.48 In its reply, the Commission stated that the Kadi I judgment
did not require it to disclose further information and decided to include
Mr. Kadi’s name on the list by adopting Regulation No. 1190/2008
amending Regulation No. 881/2002.49 Mr. Kadi successfully challenged
that regulation before the EGC.50
In Kadi II, the Commission, the Council, and the UK each brought an
appeal against the ruling of the EGC.51 They argued, in essence, that the
EGC had erred in law by applying a level of judicial scrutiny which was,
in their view, excessive.52 However, the ECJ dismissed the appeals.53
Confirming its previous findings in Kadi I, it ruled that the EU Courts
“must . . . ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the law-
fulness of all Union acts in the light of the fundamental rights form-
ing an integral part of the European Union legal order, including
46. Case T-85/09, Kadi v. Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R. II-5177, ¶¶ 49-54.
47. Id. ¶ 53.
48. Id. ¶ 55.
49. Id. ¶¶ 56-60.
50. Id. ¶¶ 193-95.
51. Joined Cases C-584, C-593, & C-595/10P, Comm’n v. Kadi (Kadi II) (July 18,
2013), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62010J0584&lang1=en&type=TXT&an
cre=.
52. Id. ¶ 74.
53. Id. ¶ 165.
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review of such measures as are designed to give effect to resolutions
adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of
the United Nations.”54
Notably, this means that the EU Courts must examine whether rules as
to procedure and rules as to competence, including whether or not the
legal basis is adequate, are observed. They must also determine whether
the competent EU authority has
(i) disclose[d] to the person concerned the summary of reasons pro-
vided by the Sanctions Committee which is the basis for listing or
maintaining the listing of that person’s name in Annex I to Regula-
tion No. 881/2002, (ii) enable[d] him effectively to make known his
observations on that subject, and (iii) examine[d], carefully and im-
partially, whether the reasons alleged [were] well founded, in the
light of the observations presented by that person and any exculpa-
tory evidence that [might] be produced by him.55
In that regard,
it is for that authority to assess . . . whether it [was] necessary to seek
the assistance of the Sanctions Committee and, through that commit-
tee, the Member of the UN which proposed the listing of the individ-
ual concerned on that committee’s Consolidated List, in order to
obtain . . . the disclosure of information or evidence, confidential or
not, to enable it to discharge its duty of careful and impartial
examination.56
Additionally, the EU Courts must verify whether the competent EU au-
thority has complied with the requirements flowing from Article 296
TFEU, and whether the contested decision “is taken on a sufficiently
solid factual basis” (i.e. “whether [the] reasons [set out in the summary],
or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to
support that decision, is substantiated”).57 Consequently, “it is for [the
EU Courts], in order to carry out that examination, to request the compe-
tent [EU] authority, when necessary, to produce information or evidence,
confidential or not, relevant to such an examination.”58
54. Id. ¶ 97. It is worth noting that Mr. Kadi was also subject to blocking orders in the
US. See, in this regard, Kadi v. Geithner, 2012 WL 898778, at *2, *11 (D.D.C. Mar. 19,
2012). However, he was unsuccessful in challenging the decision of the Office of Foreign
Assets Control that ordered the freezing of his assets. Id. at *11. Regarding the standard of
review, the US District Court for the District of Columbia held that “[c]ourts are particu-
larly mindful that their review is highly deferential when matters of foreign policy and
national security are concerned.” Id. at *6; see also Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242
(1984); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. V. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 84 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (holding that “[b]locking orders are an important component of U.S. foreign policy,
and the President’s choice of this tool to combat terrorism is entitled to particular defer-
ence”). See Jennifer C. Daskal, Pre-Crime Restraints: The Explosion of Targeted, Noncus-
todial Prevention, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 341-44 (2014).
55. Kadi II, ¶ 135.
56. Id. ¶ 115.
57. Id. ¶ 119.
58. Id. ¶ 120.
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If the competent EU authority is unable to obtain the relevant infor-
mation or evidence from the UN,
it is then the duty of [the EU Courts] to base their decision solely on
the material which has been disclosed to them, namely, in this case,
the indications contained in the narrative summary of reasons pro-
vided by the Sanctions Committee, the observations and exculpatory
evidence that may have been produced by the person concerned and
the response of the competent [EU] authority to those
observations.59
It follows that “the fact that the party concerned and the [EU] Courts . . .
do not have access to information or evidence which the competent [EU]
authority does not have in its possession [does not constitute], as such, an
infringement of the rights of the defence or the right to effective judicial
protection.”60
If, on the other hand, the competent EU authority manages to obtain
the relevant information or evidence from the UN, the EU Courts must
have access to all the relevant information and evidence that has been
obtained by that authority.61 This means that vis-a`-vis those Courts, “the
secrecy or confidentiality of that information or evidence is no valid ob-
jection.”62 In that regard, “it is for the [EU Courts], when carrying out an
examination of all the matters of fact or law produced by the competent
[EU] authority, to determine whether the reasons relied on by that au-
thority as grounds to preclude . . . disclosure [to the person concerned]
are well founded.”63
If . . . those reasons do not preclude disclosure, . . . [the EU Courts]
shall give the competent [EU] authority the opportunity to make
such disclosure to the person concerned. If that authority does not
permit the disclosure of that information or evidence, in whole or in
part, the [EU] Courts . . . shall then undertake an examination of the
lawfulness of the contested measure solely on the basis of the mate-
rial which has been disclosed.64
Conversely, if the EU Courts find that the competent EU authority was
right to oppose disclosure,
it is necessary to strike an appropriate balance between the require-
ments attached to the right to effective judicial protection, in particu-
lar respect for the principle of an adversarial process, and those
flowing from the security of the European Union or its Member
States or the conduct of their international relations.65
As to Mr. Kadi, the ECJ upheld the operative part of the EGC judg-
ment, observing that
59. Id. ¶ 123.
60. Id. ¶ 139.
61. Id. ¶ 124.
62. Id. ¶ 125.
63. Id. ¶ 126.
64. Id. ¶ 127.
65. Id. ¶ 128.
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none of the allegations presented against Mr. Kadi in the summary
provided by the Sanctions Committee are such as to justify the adop-
tion, at European Union level, of restrictive measures against him,
either because the statement of reasons is insufficient, or because
information or evidence which might substantiate the reason con-
cerned, in the face of detailed rebuttals submitted by the party con-
cerned, is lacking.66
CONCLUDING REMARKS
It follows from the Kadi judgments that considerations relating to in-
ternational peace and security may not, as such, render decisions impos-
ing restrictive measures upon named persons and entities immune from
judicial review. Those considerations are not “political questions” outside
the scope of such review. On the contrary, in compliance with Article 19
TEU, the EU Courts, as guarantor of the rule of law within the EU, must
exercise their review powers in full.
66. Id. ¶ 163. Please note that on Oct. 5 2012, the UNSC Sanctions Committee re-
moved the name of Mr. Kadi from the Al-Qaida Sanctions List. Press Release, Security
Council, Security Council Al-Quaida Sanctions Committee Deletes Entry of Yasin Abdul-
lah Ezzedine Qadi-From Its List, U.N. Press Release SC/10785 (Oct. 5, 2012).
